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I Introduction
The fate of a number of African economies is
closely linked to that of commodity markets.
For instance, Collier (2007) estimates that
commodity boom in 2005 and 2006 added
2.5%  to  the  growth  of  a  typical  African
economy. Over the last decade, commodity
prices, and volatility, have increased (Figure
1), reflecting mainly:
• Economic  cycles: Commodity  prices
fluctuations  are  driven  by  the  actual  or
expected performance of major economies,
notably BRIC countries. Related to that are
exchange rate fluctuations which play a role
as major commodity markets denominate
prices in USD or Euro. 
• Speculation: Interest that investors have
been taking in dealing with commodities
and commodity derivatives have mattered.1
Speculators are likely to have accelerated
and amplified the number and magnitude
of  price  swings  that  are  not  related  to
market fundamentals. 
• Supply shocks: affect prices or production
levels.  Recent  political  events  in  Côte
d’Ivoire,  which  produces  40  percent  of
world  raw  cocoa,  caused  the  price  of
cocoa  to  mark  new  record  highs  while
current political turmoil in Libya put upward
pressure on oil prices.
• Shift to Just-in-time inventory management,
led  demand  changes  to  result  in  price
fluctuations rather than inventory changes. 
Price  volatility  affects  macroeconomic
stability and economic planning. Therefore,
the  cost  of  not  managing,  or  poor
management of, price volatility is high. For
instance, losses in Malawi’s oil stabilization
fund reached 1.5 percent of gross domestic
product by 2008 (Kojima, 2009). This brief
aims at discussing strategies available for
African  countries  to  manage  commodity
price  volatility.  Africa’s  exposure  to
commodities, and major barriers impeding
the  continent  capacity  to  cope  with
commodities price risk, will be discussed as
well. 
* Thouraya Triki is a Principal Research Economist at the African Development Bank and Youssef Affes is Managing Director
at Spot Global Trading.
1 The Bank for International Settlement (2010) reports that the gross market value of commodity derivatives contracts
increased from USD 177 billion at end June 2004 to USD 492 billion at June-end 2010. A 2010 survey conducted by
Reuters shows that speculation on oil prices increased prices by USD 10 to USD 30 a barrel, thus costing consumers at
least 300 billion a year.    
• Africa’s  exposure  to  different  commodity  classes  require  differentiated
strategies to address the problem of commodity price volatility. The “one-
size-fits-all” approach should be avoided. More attention should also be
given to the problem of speculation and to non-oil commodities.
• Management of commodity price volatility should not be restricted to a
single strategy in order to fully benefit from all available options while
reducing their limitations to a minimum. 
• Interventions should not be limited to the supply side but also cover the
demand side: capacity building and technical assistance are as important as
the development of derivatives markets.II Africa’s exposure 
to major commodities
Table 1 classifies commodities and provides
a list of African countries that are highly
dependent on commodities exports. Table
2 provides a simplified commodity current
account for Africa in 2008 and 2009. With
the  exception  of  few  commodities  like
Cocoa, sugar and gold, most commodities
experienced a steep price increase in 2008
that was followed by a sharp decrease in
2009. Higher prices in 2008 affected the
African current account in a positive way as
key  commodities  exports  exceeded  key
commodities imports by USD 319 billion;
compared  to  USD  192  billion  in  2008.
Nevertheless,  the  impact  is  highly
dependent on the type of commodity.
Africa  is  a  net  importer  of  grains  and
oilseeds (Table 2). The 2008 increase in the
price of these commodities translated into
an additional USD 8 billion in their food bill
compared to 2009 levels. This happened in
spite  of  lower  imported  volumes.  For
example, Nigeria reduced its imports from
13 million tons in 2006 to less than 3 million
in 2008 as a consequence of a threefold
increase in wheat prices. Conversely, Africa
is a net exporter of soft commodities, as
well  as  mineral  and  metal  commodities,
with  the  notable  exception  of  sugar.
Movements in market prices of key soft
commodities between 2008 and 2009, led
to a USD 848 million decrease in exports
(mainly  driven  by  decreasing  coffee  and
cotton  prices)  and  a  USD  108  million
increase in imports (driven by increasing
sugar  and  cocoa  prices).  Similarly,
decreasing prices of key mineral and metal
commodities translated into a net loss of
almost USD 2 billion for Africa. 
Africa  is  also  a  net  exporter  of  energy
commodities. Decreasing prices in 2009
reduced the African energy import bill by
USD 370 million and African oil exports by
USD  133  billion.  However,  while  the
increase  in  imports  benefited  a  large
number of African countries, decrease in
energy exports was absorbed mainly by
few  countries  namely  Nigeria,  Algeria,
Angola and Libya. 
III Who bears the economic 
cost of commodity price 
volatility?  
Commodity imports
State-controlled institutions have monopoly
on imports of key agricultural commodities
in most African countries. These institutions
mainly  deal  on  the  cash  market  and
manage  price  risk  only  by  timing  their
tenders  and  managing  their  inventories.
Being very passive in managing price risk,
government institutions have been facing
increasing deficits thus creating a burden
for government budgets. Several African
countries  liberalized  trade  on  selected
commodities, including agricultural ones.
For  instance,  the  office  des  cereales in
Tunisia  privatized  trade  of  corn  and
soybean. Conversely, private players are
increasingly  trying  to  lock  in  prices  by
buying derivatives. Yet, important variations
exist  across  Africa.  While  animal  feed
producers in Algeria and Tunisia are actively
covering their price exposure, the cotton
company of Zimbabwe does not seem to
use derivatives to manage commodity price
risk.2
The procurement of energy inputs is often
controlled by government agencies as well.
In the absence of hedging, new purchases
are exposed to higher prices on the spot
market.  With  notable  exceptions  like
Ghana, which put in place a commodity
price risk management policy in 2010, most
African countries do not actively manage
price  risk.  Similarly,  for  most  airlines  in
Africa, “the concept of risk management is
not known or understood” (AFAA, 2006).
Likewise, importers of metal and mineral
commodities do not seem to be actively
involved  in  managing  price  risk.  For
instance,  metal  importers  in  Tunisia,
including the state-owned Fouledh, which
controls 50% of the market do not hedge.
Commodity exports
State marketing boards act as a monopole
for  exports  of  agricultural  commodities
paying producers fixed prices but on-selling
at  international  prices.  Thus  marketing
boards bear the upside and downside risk.
However, the downside risk remains small
since fixed price paid to producers is often
significantly low compared to international
prices. Few African exporting countries are
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Box 1 Derivatives in action
Cocobod has been successful in using derivatives to stabilize cocoa revenues, Armah (2008) shows
that futures-hedging is value adding for major cocoa exporters in West Africa, but that full hedging
is not optimal given transaction costs. KNCU was assisted by the International Task Force on
Commodity Risk Management to hedge its 2000-2002 crop by buying options. This allowed it to
maintain guaranteed minimum prices to farmers. Unfortunately, KNCU ceased hedging activities in
the following years following changes in management and their expectations that coffee prices will
not fall (Rutten and Youssef, 2007). 
In South Africa, Minnitt et al. (2007) estimate total benefits from hedging to the gold mining industry
between 1986 and 2006 at Rand 2.9 billion. Governments like Zambia (for copper) and Zimbabwe
(for nickel) have been also using commodity exchanges to hedge their exports (UNCTAD, 1998). 
2 According to the 2008 annual report of the cotton company of Zimbabwe, the company only hedges currency price risk. No reference is made to hedging commodity price risk.     still using marketing boards and some of
these boards, notably Cocobod, have been
successful in hedging their exposure.
Since the abolition of marketing boards,
cooperatives,  such  as  the  Kilimanjaro
Native  Co-operative  Union  (KNCU)  in
Tanzania  have  been  also  increasingly
involved in export markets (Afeikhena and
Olawale,  2000).  Cooperatives  may
guarantee minimum price to farmers which
will expose them to downside risk. Most
cooperatives are not actively hedging their
price risk despite successful experiences
(Box 1).
For energy commodities, notably oil, most
export  activities  are  jointly  overseen  by
National Oil Companies (NOCs) and private
oil  companies.  The  degree  of  NOCs’
exposure  depends  on  the  contract  with
their private partners and production levels.
For  example,  the  standard  contract  in
Algeria is a production sharing agreement
where the government retains 51% sharing,
while the government of Cameroon retains
only 20 percent participation through its
NOC.  Whether  private  companies,  who
partner with NOCs, should hedge or not is
an ongoing debate. While a company like
Exxon Mobil doesn’t hedge, Shell hedges
its entire production. Variations exist also
across African NOCs. Sonatrach (Algeria),
Sasol (South Africa) and Sonangol (Angola)
have been actively managing oil price risk
through options, swaps and structured oil
backed financing. Yet, smaller NOCs are
less active in hedging price risk.
The  market  for  mineral  and  metal
commodities seems to be less predominant
by  governments.  Many  junior  mining
companies often do not hedge as one of
their key selling points is that investors hold
their shares to gain exposure to commodity
price fluctuations. Conversely, larger players
do limited or full hedging.
IV Managing commodity 
price volatility  
Commodity price risk could be managed by
altering demand and supply, or by using ex-
post or ex-ante smoothing instruments such
as commodity derivatives and stabilization
funds. Alternatively, vulnerability to volatility
of  commodity  prices  could  be  reduced
through  diversifying  and  rationalizing
strategies.  For  instance,  several  African
initiatives  were  put  in  place  to  reduce
dependence on oil (Box 2).
Commodity Derivatives
Commodity  derivatives  seek  to  reduce
potential losses from adverse movements in
commodity  prices  through  market-based
instruments.  There  are  two  types  of
derivative securities. A first type (futures and
forwards) leads to predefined payments. The
second type (call and put options) gives the
holder flexibility to buy or sell, thus translating
into flexible flows that depend on market
movements. Producers and buyers could
hedge by directly being active on derivatives
exchanges,  through  intermediaries  like
trading houses or brokers, or through OTC
markets. In Africa, OTC markets seem to be
mainly accessible to large corporations and
cooperatives.  International  commodity
derivatives markets such as the Chicago
Board  of  trade  (CBOT),  the  New  York
Mercantile  Exchange  (NYMEX)  and  the
London Metal Exchange (LME) trade most
of commodities that are relevant for Africa
and African producers and importers have
been using them to hedge their price risk. 
Unlike exchanges that have been introduced
in  Asia  and  Latin  America  in  the  1990s,
African  markets  that  offer  commodity
derivatives, with the exception of the South
Africa-based SAFEX, have been unable to
attract significant trading volumes, and their
role, in most cases, have been limited to
providing price information and standardized
regulation. SAFEX, a division of the JSE is
Africa’s  most  important  commodity
derivatives market. The number of contracts
traded on the JSE in 2010 increased year on
year by 12 percent to stand at 2.1 million.
White  maize,  wheat  and  yellow  maize
accounted  for  46,  27  and  16  percent,
respectively,  of  all  grains  traded  on  the
Commodity Derivatives market. Futures are
more frequently traded than options and
A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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Box 2 Selected initiatives to rationalize and diversify oil consumption
In order to reduce its oil consumption, Egypt is accelerating shifting from gasoline and diesel to
natural gas in the transport sector. Morocco launched in 2008 a new energy strategy that seeks to
increase the efficiency of its public sector use of energy, including street lighting and public buildings.
Egypt also established a USD 1 billion energy development fund and targets to reach 20 percent of
renewable energy generation by 2020.
Tunisia has been a pioneer in Africa to rationalize its energy consumption by establishing a National
Agency for Energy Conservation in 1985. This agency was mandated to reduce energy intensity by
3 % annually. 
The government of Rwanda distributed 800,000 compact fluorescent lamps (CFL) between 2007
and 2010, out of which 50,000 were distributed for free and the remainder at a subsidized price to
match the price of incandescent light bulbs. Ghana also distributed 6 million CFLs in 2007 for free
as an attempt to address repeating serious power outages the country faced. Ghana introduced in
2008 a refrigerator efficiency rebate scheme as well. 
Source: Kojima (2009).A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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over 92 of open interest positions for January
2011 were held by local clients. Additional
markets offering Commodity derivatives are
available  in  Kenya  (African  Mercantile
Exchange), and Mauritius (the Global Board
Of  Trade  Ltd  (GBOT).  Bourse  Africa  in
Botswana aims at becoming a regional hub
but did not start trading yet.
Market stabilization schemes
During  the  70’s  and  80’s,  interventionist
policies  were  championed  through  the
implementation of International Commodity
Agreements (ICAs), including the internation  -
al  cocoa  agreement  (ICCA)  and  the
international coffee agreement (ICOA). These
agreements aimed at stabilizing commodity
prices through market interventions, either by
using  buffer  stocks,  export  control,  or  a
combination of both instruments. While a
buffer stock strategy looks simple at first
glance, its implementation raises challenges
related  to  the  choice  of  the  market  and
reference price, the frequency of price update
to trigger interventions and the need for a
consensus on the revised price. Further  more,
it could be challenging to sustain market
interventions over a long period. 
ICAs  failed  to  achieve  sustainable  price
stability  mainly  because  of  poor  initial
financing, disagreements between exporting
and importing countries on price levels and
allocation  of  quotas  among  exporting
countries, as well as persistent commodity
shocks  (South  centre,  2004).  African
participating  countries  were  no  longer
interested in sustaining ICAs. For instance,
Cote d’Ivoire, the largest cocoa exporter,
refused  to  join  the  1980  and  1986
international  cocoa  agreements  (South
Centre, 2004). Following the same strategy,
several African governments had developed
domestic  stabilization  policies.  The
outcomes  from  such  policies  are  mixed.
While Cote d’Ivoire “Cocoa War” in 1987 led
to  serious  economic  problems  for  the
country,  Ghana  seems  to  be  quite
successful with Cocobod.
Ex-post revenue smoothing funds
Several African countries have implemented
stabilization funds or stabilization accounts
to  smooth  ex-post  commodity-based
revenues.  Such  strategies  are  mainly
adapted for exporting countries. They do
not target commodity market prices but only
seek to smooth revenues and accordingly
consumption.  However,  the  long  lived
nature of commodity shocks makes holding
consumption  and  investment  constant
through  stabilization  funds  likely  to  fail,
especially when funds are poorly endowed
and small (Deaton and Miller, 1995). This
applies to African stabilization funds. Out of
15  SWFs  in  Africa,  8  have  explicit
stabilization  mandates  (Triki  and  Faye,
2011). With the notable exception of Algeria,
most African stabilization funds are small
(Table 3). The implementation of stabilization
funds poses also challenges in terms of
setting  up  the  rules  that  will  trigger  the
transfer to and from the stabilization fund,
defining  the  reference  price,  managing
accumulated  resources,  and  ensuring
proper governance structures. Most African
stabilization funds suffer from poor design
and governance (Triki and Faye, 2011).
Reserves accumulated in stabilization funds
have been used to close budget deficits
and repay debt. For instance, Sudan almost
exhausted  its  Oil  Revenue  Stabilization
Fund  to  meet  increased  expenditure
commitments and address reduction in aid
flows (Medani, 2010). Similarly, while Nigeria
ECA was instrumental to absorb negative
effects of commodity prices swings over
the  period  2008-2010,  its  balance  is
projected to decrease from USD 20 billion
in 2008 to less than USD 3 billion in 2010.
Thus, African stabilization funds have very
limited resources and can only be effective
to address short lived price shocks.
V Constraints to managing 
commodity price volatility
Managing  risk  is  risky!  The  following
identifies  main  reasons  why  African
producers and buyers have been lagging
behind when it comes to addressing the
problem of commodity price volatility.
Small Size
Most agricultural commodities in Africa are
produced by small-scale farmers who have
limited  financial  resources  to  access
exchanges and even less to manage price
risk.  This  contrasts  with  practices  in
developed  countries.  For  example,  90
percent  of  farmers  in  the  US  sell  their
products on the Chicago Board of Trade.
The problem of size affects also the extent
of derivative market development. Indeed,
the existence of a thriving spot market is
necessary for the success of a derivatives
exchange. With the notable exception of
Nigeria, South Africa and few North African
countries, commodity markets in Africa are
small and highly informal (UNCTAD, 2005)
which impedes the development of liquid
spot markets and consequently derivatives
markets. 
Lack of capacity
The  complex  nature  of  commodity  risk
management instruments requires a certain
level  of  financial  literacy.  Users  need  to
select risk management instruments and
design a strategy. This could be challenging
especially  for  small  producers/buyers.
Often,  African  potential  users  do  not
understand  how  markets  work,  the
advantages of managing risk, and how risk
can be mitigated. This is particularly true for
government bodies and small private usersand producers of commodities. Capacity
building  is  needed  to  help  African
producers and buyers understand the full
range of instruments available to manage
commodity  price  risk.  Capacity  building
should also cover financial institutions and
intermediaries who are likely to sell these
products as well as supervisory authorities
that will oversee risk management activities.
Inappropriate market structure
African  commodity  markets  lack  both
physical  and  soft  infrastructure.  Soft
infrastructure  includes  transaction
facilitators, information analyzers, credibility
enhancers, and regulators. Given lack of
market  research,  commodity  producers
and buyers face difficulties to set up prices
(spot and future), define the quantity they
should  buy  or  sell  and  identify  which
markets  offer  best  options  for  trading.
Furthermore,  traded  commodities  on
African markets are often not graded. This
restricts  African  producers’  access  to
international markets. 
Physical  infrastructure  is  key  for  the
success of a commodity exchange as well,
especially  warehouses  where  physical
transactions  should  take  place.
Transportation and distribution are essential
so that delivery location can be credibly
specified in the contract. Moreover, physical
/ communication networks provide traders
with spot market information which is very
useful to estimate the basis. The efficiency
of the physical infrastructure and moving
products  around  different  geographical
positions in different time frames is directly
related  to  the  basis  and  therefore  the
competitiveness of using an exchange. 
Regulatory barriers
Control  on  foreign  exchange  in  several
African countries makes it impossible for
domestic buyers and sellers to hedge on
international  markets.  Some  African
countries  which  liberalized  their  capital
account  do  not  authorize  foreign
investments for hedging purposes. In order
to overcome these restrictions, importers in
countries like Tunisia hedge their price risk
through their commodity suppliers. While
such  practice  reduces  their  exposure  to
price risk, it prevents them from adjusting
their hedging positions to price movements,
or to use options. International providers of
risk mitigation instruments are also facing
increasing pressure to fulfill the Know Your
Client  requirements.  This  led  to  an
increasing reluctance to deal with African
clients.  For  instance,  ARFAA  (2006)
concludes  that  most  African  airlines  are
unable to access fuel hedging instruments
because  of  providers’  excessive  risk
aversion.
VI Conclusion
While  progress  has  been  made  in
managing price risk, mainly at the level of
large  companies-both  private  and  state
owned- serious gaps remain. These gaps
could hinder Africa’s quest for sustained
growth.  This  brief  argues  that  African
countries  should  not  restrict  their
management of commodity price risk to a
single policy but rather seek a combination
of options to insulate their economies from
price risk. 
African  countries  should  also  seek  to
encourage  hedging  through  derivatives.
This  requires  (i)  capacity  building  for  all
market participants, and (ii) the political will
to create the right environment in which an
African  exchange,  or  a  bridge  to  an
international exchange can work. African
countries  should  not  try  to  replicate
contracts available on international markets
but rather develop market niches that are
adapted  for  the  realities  of  African
commodities. Given the small size of most
commodity markets in Africa, it could be
optimal  to  develop  regional  markets  in
harmonized  clusters  by  leveraging  on
progress  made  on  regional  integration.
Moreover,  govern  ments  of  involved
countries should offer incentives to state-
institutions to hedge and channel, at least
partly, their hedging operations to these
regional  markets  to  boost  volume.  The
success  of  a  regional  market  will  need
some pre-requisites like harmonizing trade
and  exchange  rate  policies,  setting  up
agreeable rules of grades and standards,
and  implementing  proper  contract
enforcement mechanisms.
African  countries  should  also  adopt
complementary  risk  management
strategies.  Long  term  purchase
agreements  between  commodity
producers and users in different African
countries like oil producers and aluminum
producers could also be used to manage
price volatility. 
Last but not least, Africa should support
initiatives aimed at reducing speculation on
key commodities markets, including margin
limits  (by  commodity  and  in  aggregate).
While  healthy  speculation  could  have
positive effects on commodity markets, it
needs to be closely managed. 
A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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Source: Authors’ calculation using IMF data.
Figure 1 Selected commodity indices (1980-2011)
Table 1 Classification of commodities
Source: Authors’ calculation, data is from AfDB Statistics Department; COMTRADE Database and UN statistics Division.
Commodity category Commodity sub-categories Countries with a share of exports from 
commodity superior to 20% (2009 data)
Agricultural Grains and oilseeds – corn, wheat, soybeans,
soymeal, soyoil, oat and rice
Soft commodities- sugar, cocoa, coffee and cot-
ton
Benin, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Cote
d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Rwanda, Sao





Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Nigeria, Chad, Libya,
DRC, Sudan, Algeria, Gabon, Cameroon, Egypt,
Somalia,




Zambia, Burkina Faso, Namibia, Mali, DRC, A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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Table 2 Africa’s simplified commodity current account (2008-2009)
Year 2008 Year 2009
In Billion, USD IMPORT EXPORT IMPORT EXPORT
Grains and oilseeds
Corn 2.65  0.41  2.27  0.53 
Wheat 10.60  0.11  7.05  0.14 
Soybeans  0.76  0.02  0.82  0.01 
Soybean oil/byproducts 3.06  0.13  2.22  0.12 
Palm oil 2.83  0.22  2.13  0.18 
Rice 13.30  0.86  10.58  0.88 
Total grains and oilseeds 33.20  1.76  25.08  1.87 
Soft commodities
Sugar, prep. Honey 3.27  1.44  3.67  1.38 
Cocoa 0.16  7.75  0.21  7.75 
Coffee and substitute 0.66  1.90  0.45  1.72 
Cotton 0.38  1.59  0.25  0.97 
Total Soft commodities 4.48  12.68  4.59  11.83 
Metals and Minerals
Copper 2.32  4.94  1.71  3.72 
Gold, non monetary 5.17  7.31  1.30  7.65 
Ores and conc. of Uranuim 0.00  0.25  0.00  0.28 
Platinum and other met. Plat 0.01  14.27  0.06  8.78 
silver, unwrought, 
unworked
0.02  0.08  0.01  0.03 
Total Metals 7.53  26.84  3.08  20.45 
Energy
Gas, natural and manuf. 3.02  38.99  2.15  33.35 
Petrol.oils, crude and c.o 8.36  295.04  8.86  167.77 
Total Energy 11.38  334.03  11.02  201.13 
Total Commodities 56.59  375.30  43.76  235.27 
Total Trade 437.53  585.14  368.46  382.52 
Source: Authors’ estimates, data is from AfDB statistics department; COMTRADE Database and UN statistics division.
Table 3 Selected stabilization funds in Africa 







Fond de Régulation des Recettes  Algeria 2000  59.34 2009
Fonds de Stabilisation des Recettes Budgétaires Chad 2006  0.003 2010
Reserve Fund for Oil Angola 2004  0.2 2008
Fonds de Stabilisation des Recettes Budgétaires Congo Unknown 1.64 2010
Fonds de Stabilisation des Recettes Budgétaires Equatorial Guinea Unknown 1.39 2010
Fonds National des Revenus des Hydrocarbures Mauritania 2006  0.034 2009
Excess Crude Fund (Account) Nigeria 2004  3 2010
Oil Revenue Stabilization Fund Sudan 2002  0.15 2009
Source: Triki and Faye (2011).A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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